Abstract:
In a noncooperative game, a team is a set of players that have
identical payoffs. We investigate zero-sum games where a team of
several players plays against a single adversary. The team is
not regarded as a single player because the team members might
not be able to coordinate their actions. In such a game, a
certain equilibrium can be selected naturally: the team-maxmin
equilibrium. It assures the team players the best payoff they can
hope for, given their inability to coordinate. A team-maxmin
equilibrium exists, and in a generic game it is unique.
Keywords:
Equilibrium selection, maxmin strategy,
noncooperative multiperson game, zero-sum game.
In:
Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 309-321.
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