Constructing and computing equilibria for two-player games

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Nash equilibria of bimatrix games

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 6 \\ 2 & 5 \\ \hline 3 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \qquad B = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 1 \\ 1 & 3 \\ \hline 4 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

Nash equilibrium =

pair of strategies x, y with

- x best response to y and
- y best response to x.

Mixed equilibria

$$\begin{array}{c|cc}
 & 0 & 6 \\
 & 2 & 5 \\
 & 3 & 3
 \end{array}$$

A =
$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 6 \\ 2 & 5 \\ 3 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$
 B = $\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 1 \\ 1 & 3 \\ 4 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} 2/3 \\ 1/3 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$x^{T}B = 5/3 5/3$$

$$Ay = \begin{bmatrix} 4 \\ 4 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}$$
 $y^T = \begin{bmatrix} 1/3 & 2/3 \\ \end{bmatrix}$

$$y^{T} = \begin{vmatrix} 1/3 & 2/3 \end{vmatrix}$$

only pure best responses can have probability > 0

Best response condition

Let \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} be mixed strategies of player I and II, respectively. Then \mathbf{x} is a best response to \mathbf{y}

 \iff for all pure strategies i of player I:

$$x_i > 0 \implies (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_i = u = \max\{(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_k \mid 1 \le k \le m\}.$$


Here, $(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_i$ is the *i*th component of $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y}$, which is the expected payoff to player I when playing row *i*.

Proof.


$$\mathbf{x}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbf{x}_{i} (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_{i} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbf{x}_{i} (u - (u - (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_{i}))$$


$$= \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbf{x}_{i} u - \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbf{x}_{i} (u - (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_{i}) = u - \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbf{x}_{i} (u - (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_{i}) \le u,$$


because $\mathbf{x}_i \ge 0$ and $u - (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_i \ge 0$ for all i. Furthermore, $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y} = u \iff \mathbf{x}_i > 0$ implies $(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y})_i = u$, as claimed.





































































































Alternative view





































Equilibrium = completely labeled strategy pair



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Constructing games using geometry


low dimension: 2, 3, (4) pure strategies:

subdivide mixed strategy simplex into response regions, label suitably


high dimension:

use polytopes with known combinatorial structure e.g. for constructing games with many equilibria, or long Lemke-Howson computations [Savani & von Stengel, FOCS 2004, Econometrica 2006]

Construct isolated non-quasi-strict equilibrium





Construct isolated non-quasi-strict equilibrium





$$A = \begin{vmatrix} 0 & 2 & 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 0 & 0 & 2 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 3 \end{vmatrix}$$


$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 5 & 6 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 2 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
























Why Lemke-Howson works


LH finds at least one Nash equilibrium because


finitely many "vertices"


for nondegenerate (generic) games:


- unique starting edge given missing label
- unique continuation
- ⇒ precludes "coming back" like here:






































































































Odd number of Nash equilibria!



Best response polyhedron H_2 for player 2

$$H_2 = \{ (\overline{\mathbf{y}}_4, \overline{\mathbf{y}}_5, \mathbf{u}) \mid$$

$$\boxed{1}: \quad \mathbf{3}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_4 + \mathbf{3}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_5 \leq \mathbf{u}$$


$$2$$
: $2\overline{y}_4 + 5\overline{y}_5 \le u$

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \hline \mathbf{1} : & \mathbf{3}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_4 + \mathbf{3}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_5 \leq & \mathbf{u} \\ \hline \mathbf{2} : & \mathbf{2}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_4 + \mathbf{5}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_5 \leq & \mathbf{u} \\ \hline \mathbf{3} : & \mathbf{6}\overline{\mathbf{y}}_5 \leq & \mathbf{u} \\ \end{array}$$

$$\overline{\mathbf{y}}_4 + \overline{\mathbf{y}}_5 = 1$$

$$(4)$$
: $\overline{\mathbf{y}}_4$ ≥ 0

$$\overline{\mathbf{5}}$$
: $\overline{\mathbf{y}}_5 \geq \mathbf{0}$




Best response polytope Q for player 2

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
y_4 & y_5 \\
\hline
1 & 3 & 3 \\
2 & 2 & 5 \\
\hline
3 & 0 & 6
\end{array} = A$$

$$\mathbf{Q} = \{ (\mathbf{y}_4, \mathbf{y}_5) \mid$$


- 1: $3y_4 + 3y_5 \le 1$ 2: $2y_4 + 5y_5 \le 1$
- $6y_5 \le 1$
- (4): $y_4 \ge 0$ (5): $y_5 \ge 0$ }


$$Q = \{ y \mid Ay \leq 1, y \geq 0 \}$$



Projective transformation

 H_2 , **Q** same face incidences






Best response polytope Q for player 2

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
y_4 & y_5 \\
\hline
1 & 3 & 3 \\
2 & 2 & 5 \\
\hline
3 & 0 & 6
\end{array} = A$$


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
$$Q = \{ y \mid Ay \leq 1, y \geq 0 \}$$




Best response polytope P for player 1




Equilibrium = completely labeled pair





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
mixed equilibrium



































































Complexity of Lemke-Howson

- finds at least one Nash equilibrium,
 pivots like Simplex algorithm for linear programming
- Simplex may be exponential [Klee-Minty cubes]
- exponentially many steps of Lemke-Howson for any dropped label?
- Yes! This is our result.

Our result

There are $d \times d$ games with exactly one Nash equilibrium, for which the Lemke-Howson algorithm takes $\geq \phi^{3d/4}$ many steps for any dropped label (with Golden Ratio $\phi = (\sqrt{5} + 1) / 2 = 1.618...$)


We will show this extending


[Morris 1994] - exponentially long Lemke paths (finds symmetric equilibria of symmetric games)


[von Stengel 1999] - games with many equilibria


using dual cyclic polytopes

Vertices as bit patterns










Vertices as bit patterns




Cyclic polytopes

moment curve in R^d

$$oldsymbol{\mu}: \mathsf{R} o \mathsf{R}^d \hspace{5mm} t \mapsto oldsymbol{\mu}(t) = (t, t^2, \dots, t^d)^ op.$$

cyclic polytope in dim d with N vertices: $t_1 < t_2 < \cdots < t_N$

$$C_d(N) := \mathsf{conv}\{oldsymbol{\mu}(t_1), \dots, oldsymbol{\mu}(t_N)\}$$




Facets of $C_d(N)$

Any d of the vertices $\mu(t_1),\ldots,\mu(t_N)$ define hyperplane F in \mathbb{R}^d .


F facet \iff all other vertices are on one side of F

Example: $C_3(6)$, vertices 100110




Gale's Evenness condition

bitstring $s=s_1s_2\dots s_N, \qquad s_i\in\{0,1\}$ e.g. 100110 defines facet $F=\operatorname{conv}\{\mu(t_i)\mid s_i=1\}$ of $C_d(N)$



 \iff s has only even-length substrings 0110, 0111110, 01111110,

forbidden: substrings 010, 01110, ... of odd length.




Polar polytopes


$$P = \operatorname{conv}\{c_1, \ldots, c_N\}, \quad 0 \in \operatorname{int}(P) \quad \operatorname{vertices} c_i$$

polar polytope

$$P^{\Delta} = \{ \ z \mid c_1^{ op}z \leq 1, \ldots, \ c_N^{ op}z \leq 1 \} \quad ext{ facets } \{ z \in P^{\Delta} \mid oldsymbol{c_i}^{ op}z = 1 \}$$







Dual cyclic polytopes

- vertices = strings of N bits with d bits "1",
- no odd substrings 010, 01110, 0111110, . . .[Gale evenness]

```
Example: d=4, N=6 d=2, N=6 (4 \times 2 \text{ game})

111100 000011

111001 000110

110110 011000

100111 100001

011011

011011

001111
```

Vertices of $C_d(2d)^\Delta$ and complementarity

vertex	no.	defining facets	labels (example)
	1	00001111	
	2	00011011	
	3	00011110	
	4	00110011	
	5	00110110	
	6	00111100	
	7	01100011	
	8	01100110	23 67
	9	01101100	
	10	01111000	
$C_4(8)^{\Delta}$	11	10000111	
	12	10001101	
	13	10011001	(1) (4)(5) (8)
	14	10110001	
	15	11000011	
	16	11000110	
	17	11001100	
	18	11011000	
	19	11100001	
	20	11110000	


Permuted labels

P = dual cyclic polytope in dimension d with 2d facets

with facets labeled

Q = P


with facets labeled





only **one** non-artificial equilibrium:


000000 111111 111111 000000


Lemke–Howson will take long to find it!














A(4) = path for d=4, label 1




B(6) = path for d=6, label 12




A(4) is prefix of B(6)




A(6) = path for d=6, label 1



B(6) is prefix of A(6)



Suffix of A(6) = C(6) = A(4)+B(6)



Recurrences for longest paths

```
A(d) = LH path dropping label 1 in dim d
```

B(d) = LH path dropping label 2d in dim d

$$C(d) = suffix of A(d)$$

lengths of

```
B(2) C(2) A(2) B(4) C(4) A(4) B(6) C(6) A(6) ...
```

are the **Fibonacci** numbers

Growth rate of Fibonacci numbers

n	Fn	F_{n+1}	F_{n+1}/F_n
1	1	1	1.0
2	1	2	2.0
3	2	3	1.5
4	3	5	1.66666666667
5	5	8	1.6
6	8	13	1.625
7	13	21	1.61538461538
8	21	34	1.61904761905
9	34	55	1.61764705882
10	55	89	1.61818181818
11	89	144	1.61797752809
12	144	233	1.6180555556
13	233	377	1.61802575107
14	377	610	1.61803713528

Growth rate of Fibonacci numbers

Successive values of F_{n+1}/F_n seem to "converge" to a certain number, about 1.618....

That is, for larger *n* the Fibonacci numbers seem to grow at this rate according to

$$F_{n+1} \approx 1.618 \dots F_n$$

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The following is a geometric plausibility argument (not a proof) for this specific growth rate.




















































The solutions to $x \cdot (x - 1) = 1$, that is, $x^2 - x - 1 = 0$, are

$$x=\frac{1}{2}\pm\sqrt{\frac{1}{4}}+1=\frac{1\pm\sqrt{5}}{2}$$
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
The number $(1+\sqrt{5})/2\approx 1.618033988$ is known as the Golden Ratio ϕ .

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


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```

are the **Fibonacci** numbers

Exponential path lengths

longest paths: drop label 1 or 2d, paths A(d), B(d)

path length
$$\Omega$$
 (ϕ 3d/2)

with Golden Ratio $\phi = (\sqrt{5} + 1) / 2 = 1.618...$

shortest paths: drop label 3d/2, path B(d/2)+B(d/2+2)

path length
$$\Omega(\phi^{3d/4}) = \Omega(1.434...d)$$

Summary and extensions

- NE of a bimatrix game = combinatorial polytope problem
- label dual cyclic polytopes,
 equilibrium at end of exponentially long paths
- but: fully mixed equilibrium easily guessed by support enumeration algorithms
- can extend to d × 2d games with hard-to-guess support (exponentially many guesses on average)
 and exponentially long paths

The 1984 song "The longest time" by Billy Joel was given the following "computer science" version by Daniel Barrett, who wrote it as a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University, "on May 1, 1988, during a difficult Algorithms II final exam", and subsequently recorded it.

Woh oh-oh find the longest path Woh oh-oh find the longest path.

If you say P is NP tonight there would still be papers left to write I have a weakness I'm addicted to completeness and I keep searching for the longest path.

The algorithm I would like to see is of polynomial degree but it's elusive nobody has found conclusive evidence that we can find the longest path.

I have been hard working for so long I swear it's right and he marks it wrong somehow I feel sorry when it's done GPA 2.1 is more than I hope for

Garey, Johnson,
Karp and other men (and women, too)
try to make it order N log N
am I a mad fool
if I spend my life in grad school
forever following the longest path

Woh oh-oh-oh find the longest path Woh oh-oh find the longest path Woh oh-oh find the longest path.